Rational verification: game-theoretic verification of multi-agent systems
Authors:
Open Access
- 3 August 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Intelligence
- Vol. 51 (9) , 6569-6584
Abstract
We provide a survey of the state of the art ofrational verification: the problem of checking whether a given temporal logic formulaϕis satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behaviorϕrepresents under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the overall framework of rational verification, we discuss key results obtained in the past few years as well as relevant related work in logic, AI, and computer science.Keywords
This publication has 73 references indexed in Scilit:
- Anytime coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with positive or negative externalitiesArtificial Intelligence, 2012
- A survey of stochastic ω-regular gamesJournal of Computer and System Sciences, 2012
- Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game TheorySynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 2011
- From Nondeterministic B\"uchi and Streett Automata to Deterministic Parity AutomataLogical Methods in Computer Science, 2007
- Deterministic generators and games for Ltl fragmentsACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 2004
- A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition GamesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Alternating-time temporal logicJournal of the ACM, 2002
- Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the InternetAmerican Economic Review, 2002
- Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formationArtificial Intelligence, 1998
- The complexity of propositional linear temporal logicsJournal of the ACM, 1985