Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk
Authors:
- 1 August 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 105 (2) , 450-468
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This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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