Abstract
Open-access competition is rapidly reshaping European high-speed rail (HSR) markets, yet little is known about how competitive pressure affects pricing once entry has occurred. We address this gap by examining how changes in competitors' presence affect average fares and fare dispersion of the incumbent. We exploit the case of Spain, where liberalization was rolled out through a regulated capacity-allocation process, resulting in a market served by three operators offering four HSR products. Using monthly product-route transaction data from the Trainline booking platform covering January 2023 to July 2024, we estimate reduced-form fare models for more than 70 markets, distinguishing between the extensive and intensive margins of competition. We find that stronger competition exerts downward pressure on incumbent fares while increasing fare dispersion, with both effects reaching 25% in four-product markets relative to monopoly markets. Fare reductions are largely driven by independent entrants, whose competitive effects are broadly comparable despite their different business models, although weaker on routes where the incumbent also provides high-speed services at fixed fares. However, greater fare dispersion emerges when competition comes from rivals operating in the same market segment as the incumbent. While more price-sensitive passengers benefit from lower fares, travelers with a higher willingness to pay for service quality may continue to face relatively high prices.

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