Ownership and Control in Outsourcing To China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory Of the Firm*
Authors:
- Robert C. FeenstraRFRobert C. Feenstra
- Gordon H. HansonGHGordon H. Hanson
- 1 May 2005
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 120 (2) , 729-761
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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