Non-reflexivity and Revenge
Open Access
- 12 November 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 51 (1) , 201-218
Abstract
We present a revenge argument for non-reflexive theories of semantic notions – theories which restrict the rule of assumption, or (equivalently) initial sequents of the form φ ⊩ φ. Our strategy follows the general template articulated in Murzi and Rossi [21]: we proceed via the definition of a notion of paradoxicality for non-reflexive theories which in turn breeds paradoxes that standard non-reflexive theories are unable to block.Keywords
Funding Information
- Austrian Science Fund (P29716-G24)
- Paris Lodron University of Salzburg
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