The Market for Corporate Control and Corporate Cash Holdings
Author:
- Lee Foster PinkowitzLPLee Foster Pinkowitz
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Conventional wisdom asserts that firms with large cash holdings are likely takeover targets. Using hostile takeover activity from 1985-1994, I find the probabilKeywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm LeverageThe Journal of Finance, 1999
- Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation1998
- Capital structure, asset structure and equity takeover premiums in cash tender offersJournal of Corporate Finance, 1997
- Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measuresJournal of Financial Economics, 1995
- The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition LikelihoodJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1992
- Share Repurchase and Takeover DeterrenceThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1991
- Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special DividendsThe Journal of Finance, 1990
- Stock Repurchase as a Takeover DefenseThe Review of Financial Studies, 1989
- Corporate financial policy and corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 1988
- Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical TestsJournal of Political Economy, 1973