Estimating bargaining strengths of Canadian chicken producers and processors using a bilateral monopoly framework
- 1 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Agribusiness
- Vol. 22 (2) , 159-173
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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