Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning
Authors:
- Sébastien BubeckSBSébastien Bubeck
- Nikhil R. DevanurNDNikhil R. Devanur
Preprint
Abstract
We consider revenue maximization in online auctions and pricing. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best fixed price, rather than the range of the values. We also show regret bounds that are almost scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. These results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a different range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Ironing in the Dark2016
- Revenue maximization with a single sampleGames and Economic Behavior, 2015
- Dynamic Pricing with Limited SupplyACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2015
- Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal AlgorithmsOperations Research, 2009
- Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown DemandAmerican Economic Review, 2003