ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS*
Authors:
- 1 March 1992
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 4 (1) , 79-108
Abstract
The formal theory of campaign contributions in elections has expanded in the past decade. The basic assumptions and results of these models are examined and analyzed. The assumptions of the models are often inappropriate for the political actors considered and the results are sometimes not empirically supported. We suggest ways in which these models may be altered to alleviate some of these problems.Keywords
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