Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives
Authors:
- Nishant DassNDNishant Dass
- Massimo MassaMMMassimo Massa
- Rajdeep PatgiriRPRajdeep Patgiri
- 24 July 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 21 (1) , 51-99
Abstract
This article studies one of the potential causes of the financial market bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutual funds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds' advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendency to herd. We argue that investing in bubble stocks amounts to herding and contracts with high incentives induce managers to diverge from the herd, thus reducing their holding of bubble stocks. The differential exposure to bubble stocks significantly impacted the funds' performance both in the period prior to March 2000, as well as afterwards.Keywords
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