Public Initiatives to Support Entrepreneurs: Credit Guarantees versus Co-Funding
Authors:
- Stefan ArpingSAStefan Arping
- Gyongyi LoranthGLGyongyi Loranth
- Alan D. MorrisonAMAlan D. Morrison
Preprint
- 1 January 2009
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze financial support for the entrepreneurial sector. State support can raise welfare by relaxing financial constraints, but it can also reduce lending standards if entrepreneurs substitute public sources of collateral for their own assets, if it encourages excessive entrepreneurial entry, or if it undermines bank monitoring incentives. We derive a "pecking order" for support schemes: support funds should be channeled first to credit guarantee schemes and then, when entrepreneurs start to substitute public for private collateral, to co-funding entrepreneurial projects. The optimal level of credit guarantee is diminishing in the costs of incentivising bank monitoring. We show in an extension that the long-term effect of public subsidies may be to impair the private sector's initiative to uncover cost savings.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Typology Of Partial Credit Guarantee Funds Around The World2008
- The Repercussions on Small Banks and Small Businesses of Procyclical Bank Capital and Countercyclical Loan GuaranteesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
- The Financing of Research and DevelopmentOxford Review of Economic Policy, 2002
- Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending ProgramSSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
- Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real SectorThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment1997
- Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial GroupsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991
- Financing Constraints and Corporate InvestmentBrookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period ProblemReview of Economic Studies, 1985
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated MonitoringReview of Economic Studies, 1984