A game theoretic investigation of deception in network security
Authors:
- Thomas E. CarrollTCThomas E. Carroll
- Daniel GrosuDGDaniel Grosu
- 3 December 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Security and Communication Networks
- Vol. 4 (10) , 1162-1172
Abstract
We perform a game theoretic investigation of the effects of deception on the interactions between an attacker and a defender of a computer network. The defender can employ camouflage by either disguising a normal system as a honeypot or by disguising a honeypot as a normal system. We model the interactions between defender and attacker using a signaling game, a non‐cooperative two player dynamic game of incomplete information. For this model, we determine which strategies admit perfect Bayesian equilibria. These equilibria are refined Nash equilibria in which neither the defender nor the attacker will unilaterally choose to deviate from their strategies. We discuss the benefits of employing deceptive equilibrium strategies in the defense of a computer network. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
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