Optimal contract design for energy procurement
Authors:
- 1 September 2014
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 62-69
Abstract
We consider a mechanism design problem for strategic agents with multi-dimensional private information and uncertainty in their utility/cost functions. We show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of contracts that can be implemented as a nonlinear pricing scheme. We illustrate the result by considering an optimal energy procurement mechanism from a strategic seller with conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants. We address the problem of risk-sharing and ex-post voluntary participation (commitment) under uncertainty.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- On incentive compatibility of deadline differentiated pricing for deferrable demand2013
- Decentralized contract design for demand response2013
- Stochastic resource auctions for renewable energy integration2011
- Multi-Dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Scoring and Settlement RulesJournal of Regulatory Economics, 2002
- Architecture of Power MarketsEconometrica, 2002
- The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring DisasterJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2002
- Designing incentive compatible contracts for effective demand managementIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2000
- Interruptible electric power service contractsJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1993
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive CompatibilityReview of Economic Studies, 1979
- Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under UncertaintyReview of Economic Studies, 1978