A moving target defense mechanism for MANETs based on identity virtualization
- 1 October 2013
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 278-286
Abstract
Mechanisms for continuously changing or shifting a system's attack surface are emerging as game-changers in cyber security. In this paper, we propose a novel defense mechanism for protecting the identity of nodes in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and defeat the attacker's reconnaissance efforts. The proposed mechanism turns a classical attack mechanism - Sybil - into an effective defense mechanism, with legitimate nodes periodically changing their virtual identity in order to increase the uncertainty for the attacker. To preserve communication among legitimate nodes, we modify the network layer by introducing (i) a translation service for mapping virtual identities to real identities; (ii) a protocol for propagating updates of a node's virtual identity to all legitimate nodes; and (iii) a mechanism for legitimate nodes to securely join the network. We show that the proposed approach is robust to different types of attacks, and also show that the overhead introduced by the update protocol can be controlled by tuning the update frequency.Keywords
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