A Generalized Two-Phase Analysis of Knowledge Flows in Security Protocols
Authors:
- Marten van DijkMDMarten van Dijk
- Blaise GassendBGBlaise Gassend
- Srinivas DevadasSDSrinivas Devadas
Preprint
Abstract
We introduce knowledge flow analysis, a simple and flexible formalism for checking cryptographic protocols. Knowledge flows provide a uniform language for expressing the actions of principals, assump- tions about intruders, and the properties of cryptographic primitives. Our approach enables a generalized two-phase analysis: we extend the two-phase theory by identifying the necessary and sufficient proper- ties of a broad class of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We also contribute a library of standard primitives and show that they satisfy our criteria.Keywords
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