Essential equilibria
- 14 October 2005
- journal article
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 102 (43) , 15706-15711
Abstract
The connected uniformly hyperstable sets of a finite game are shown to be precisely the essential components of Nash equilibria.Keywords
All Related Versions
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