Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering
Authors:
Preprint
- 1 January 2010
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The government agency's preferred mode of provision depends on the information gathering costs, the costs of innovation efforts, and on the degree to which effort is contractible.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 42 references indexed in Scilit:
- Public–private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibilityInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010
- AUCTIONS, EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2006
- Building and managing facilities for public servicesJournal of Public Economics, 2006
- Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in FranceReview of Industrial Organization, 2006
- Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public ServicesReview of Industrial Organization, 2006
- Government Versus Private Ownership of Public GoodsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001
- Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- The Management of InnovationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
- Opening the black box of innovationEuropean Economic Review, 1994
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown CostsEconometrica, 1982