Contracting for Complex Products
Authors:
- 27 November 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Vol. 20 (Supplement) , i41-i58
Abstract
A fundamental source of contracting failure is product uncertainty. When the product's cost, quality, and quantity cannot be easily defined, buyers and sellers are unable to clearly and completely define exchange terms. The risk is that the buyer is the only purchaser of this “complex product,” and once the contract is let, the vendor is the only supplier. The consequence is a collective action problem in which each party has incentives to exploit contract ambiguities for their own gain at the other's expense. We lay out the theoretical case for how complex contracting risks collective action problems. We then illustrate the theory's analytic value with the case of the Coast Guard's controversial Deepwater project, a major acquisition program to upgrade and integrate its fleet of air and sea assets. Through this case, we show how managing the state of agents requires understanding how different principal-agent relations’ work.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Contracts as Reference Points*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008
- Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement ContractsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2001
- Collective Action and the Evolution of Social NormsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2000
- Governing the Hollow StateJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2000
- Do Government Bureaucrats Make Effective Use of Performance Management Information?Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1999
- THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE: EFFECTS OF ANTICIPATED INTERACTION AND FREQUENCY OF CONTACT ON BUY-SELLER COOPERATION.Academy of Management Journal, 1992
- Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural AlternativesAdministrative Science Quarterly, 1991
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970