Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning
Author:
- 1 January 2005
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 51 (1) , 60-75
Abstract
Salespeople are the eyes and ears of the firms they serve. They possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of decisions. A key question is how a firm can provide incentives to its salesforce so that it is in their interest to truthfully disclose their information about the market and to work hard. Many people have considered this question and provided solutions. Perhaps the most well-known solution is due to Gonik (1978), who proposed and implemented a clever scheme designed to elicit market information and encourage hard work. The purpose of this paper is to study Gonik's scheme and compare it with a menu of linear contracts—a solution often used in the agency literature—in a model where the market information possessed by the salesforce is important for the firm's production and inventory-planning decisions.Keywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Impact of Uncertainty and Risk Aversion on Price and Order Quantity in the Newsvendor ProblemManufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2000
- Sales-Force Incentives and Inventory ManagementManufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2000
- The Risk-Averse (and Prudent) NewsboyManagement Science, 1995
- On optimal salesforce compensation in the presence of production learning effectsInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, 1990
- Piece-Rate Incentive SchemesJournal of Labor Economics, 1987
- Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic PerspectiveMarketing Science, 1985
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent ProblemEconometrica, 1983
- Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect informationJournal of Economic Theory, 1979
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979