Do insiders share pledging affect executive pay-for-performance sensitivity?
Authors:
- Caiyue OuyangCOCaiyue Ouyang
- Jiacai XiongJXJiacai Xiong
- Lyu FanLFLyu Fan
- 1 September 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics & Finance
- Vol. 63, 226-239
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71562015)
- Educational Commission of Jiangxi Province (GJJ170353)
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