The merit of meritocracy.
Authors:
- Leanne S. Son HingLHLeanne S. Son Hing
- D. Ramona BobocelDBD. Ramona Bobocel
- Mark P. ZannaMZMark P. Zanna
- Donna M. GarciaDGDonna M. Garcia
- Stephanie S. GeeSGStephanie S. Gee
- Katie OraziettiKOKatie Orazietti
- 1 January 2011
- journal article
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 101 (3) , 433-450
Abstract
We argue that the preference for the merit principle is a separate construct from hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., system justification beliefs, prejudice, social dominance orientation), including descriptive beliefs that meritocracy currently exists in society. Moreover, we hypothesized that prescriptive beliefs about merit should have a stronger influence on reactions to the status quo when hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies are weak (vs. strong). In 4 studies, participants' preference for the merit principle and hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were assessed; later, the participants evaluated organizational selection practices that support or challenge the status quo. Participants' prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit were separate constructs; only the latter predicted other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies. In addition, as hypothesized, among participants who weakly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, the stronger their preference for the merit principle, the more they opposed selection practices that were perceived to be merit violating but the more they supported practices that were perceived to be merit restoring. In contrast, those who strongly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were always motivated to support the status quo, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.Keywords
Funding Information
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada