Why does the base rate appear to be ignored? The equiprobability hypothesis
Authors:
Open Access
- 1 December 2009
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 16 (6) , 1065-1070
Abstract
The base rate fallacy has been considered to result from people's tendency to ignore the base rates given in tasks. In the present article, we note a particular, common structure of the tasks (the imbalanced probability structure) in which the fallacy is often observed. The equiprobability hypothesis explains the mechanism that produces the fallacy. This hypothesis predicts that task material that overrides people's default equiprobability assumption can facilitate normative Bayesian inferences. The results of our two experiments strongly supported this prediction, and none of the alternative theories considered could explain the results.Keywords
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