The Evolution of Common Law
Authors:
- Nicola GennaioliNGNicola Gennaioli
- Andrei ShleiferASAndrei Shleifer
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- 1 February 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 115 (1) , 43-68
Abstract
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law’s precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.Keywords
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