Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Private Information of Analysts
Author:
- Eric ZitzewitzEZEric Zitzewitz
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper reports evidence that Regulation Fair Disclosure has had its desired effect of reducing selective disclosure of information about future earnings toKeywords
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