Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content
Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 261-272
Abstract
We consider an extension to classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives are embedded within AI-generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. Leveraging advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to seamlessly integrate sponsored creatives with AI content and accurately estimate the context-aware benefits of differing insertion positions. However, this approach introduces novel challenges; substitution effects require rigorous treatment compared to standard position auction settings, where slots are independent of each other. In this work, we formalize a mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare- and revenue-maximization mechanism design problems. We assume a specific click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair and consider two user behavior models: a multinomial logit (MNL) and a cascade model. For the MNL model, which is order-insensitive, we efficiently implement optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal mechanisms.Keywords
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