An architecture for dual reasoning
Author:
- Peter CarruthersPCPeter Carruthers
- 29 January 2009
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 109-128
Abstract
This chapter takes for granted the existence of some sort of real distinction between System 1 and System 2 reasoning processes, and asks how they are realized in the human mind-brain. In contrast with the usual view of the two systems as distinct from one another, it argues that System 2 is partly realized in cycles of operation of System 1. But System 2 is also distinctive in being action based. It is mental rehearsals of action that generate and sustain the cycles of operation of System 1 which constitute System 2. The chapter details a number of advantages of the proposed account, together with some implications for future research.Keywords
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