Collusion in the Dutch waste collection market
- 17 July 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Local Government Studies
- Vol. 33 (4) , 573-588
Abstract
In this paper we analyse whether collusion exists in the Dutch waste collection market, which shows a high degree of concentration. Although scale effects might be in accordance with this market outcome, the question is whether concentration is in fact a result of fair competition. Using data for (nearly) all Dutch municipalities, we estimate whether collusion exists and what the impact is on tariffs for waste collection. The results indicate that high concentration increases prices and therefore (partly) offsets the advantage of contracting out. The presence of competing public firms might be essential to ensure more and fair competition.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? Local Privatization in SpainThe Journal of Policy Reform, 2006
- Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the Government Contracting ProcessJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2004
- Contracting out: The Importance of a Solution for the VAT DistortionCESifo Economic Studies, 2004
- Rural—Urban Differences in Privatization: Limits to the Competitive StateEnvironment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 2003
- Applying Market Solutions to Public ServicesUrban Affairs Review, 2002
- Modelling the spatial impact of the introduction of Compulsory Competitive TenderingRegional Science and Urban Economics, 2000
- Contract Service Firms in Local Authorities: Evolving Geographies of ActivityRegional Studies, 1999
- The Impact of Compulsory Competitive Tendering on Refuse Collection ServicesFiscal Studies, 1996
- Competitive Tendering and Efficiency: The Case of Refuse CollectionFiscal Studies, 1986
- Scale, Market Structure, and the Cost of Refuse CollectionReview of Economics and Statistics, 1978