The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain
Authors:
- Andrei SeoevASAndrei Seoev
- Leonid GremyachikhLGLeonid Gremyachikh
- Anastasiia SmirnovaASAnastasiia Smirnova
- Yash MadhwalYMYash Madhwal
- Alisa KalachevaAKAlisa Kalacheva
- Dmitry BelousovDBDmitry Belousov
- Ilia ZubovIZIlia Zubov
- Aleksei SmirnovASAleksei Smirnov
- Denis FedyaninDFDenis Fedyanin
- Vladimir GorgadzeVGVladimir Gorgadze
- Yury YanovichYYYury Yanovich
Preprint
Abstract
In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional game-theoretic approaches struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment due to their reliance on complete information and static equilibrium assumptions. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent captures 49\% of available profits when deployed alongside existing searchers and 81\% when replacing the market leader, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies. Our work establishes that reinforcement learning provides a critical advantage in high-frequency MEV environments where traditional optimization methods fail, offering immediate value for industrial participants and protocol designers alike.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols2026
- Unpacking Maximum Extractable Value on Polygon: A Study on Atomic Arbitrage2025
- Game-Theoretic Analysis of Transaction Selection in DAG-Based Distributed Ledgers2025
- DeFi risk assessment: MakerDAO loan portfolio caseBlockchain: Research and Applications, 2024
- Real-time bidding with multi-agent reinforcement learning in multi-channel display advertisingNeural Computing and Applications, 2024
- Maximal extractable value: Current understanding, categorization, and open research questionsElectronic Markets, 2024
- Optimizing Real-Time Bidding Strategies: An Experimental Analysis of Reinforcement Learning and Machine Learning TechniquesProcedia Computer Science, 2024
- Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions2024
- Centralized exchanges vs. decentralized exchanges in cryptocurrency markets: A systematic literature reviewElectronic Markets, 2024
- Loan Portfolio Dataset From MakerDAO Blockchain ProjectIEEE Access, 2024