Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions
Authors:
- 1 April 2007
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 51 (2) , 251-284
Abstract
We model foreign-aid-for-policy deals, assuming that leaders want to maximize their time in office. Their actions are shaped by two political institutions, their selectorate and winning coalition. Leaders who depend on a large coalition, a relatively small selectorate, and who extract valuable policy concessions from prospective recipients are likely to give aid. Prospective recipients are likely to get aid if they have few resources, depend on a small coalition and a large selectorate, and the policy concession sought by the donor is not too politically costly. The amount of aid received, if any, increases as the recipient leader's coalition increases, the selectorate decreases, the issue's salience increases, and the domestic resources increase. The theory explains why many Third World people hate the United States and want to live there. Empirical tests using the U.S. Agency for International Development data for the post—World War II years support the model's predictions.Keywords
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and CredibilityThe Journal of Politics, 2006
- Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of LeadersBritish Journal of Political Science, 2002
- Foreign Aid and Statehood in AfricaInternational Organization, 2001
- Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific PunishmentsInternational Organization, 2000
- Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold WarThe Journal of Politics, 1998
- From domestic to international justice: the welfare state and foreign aidInternational Organization, 1995
- Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America?American Journal of Political Science, 1988
- Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American CountriesAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1985
- Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967—1976Journal of Peace Research, 1980
- Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative StudyAmerican Political Science Review, 1973