Coordination in Network Security Games: A Monotone Comparative Statics Approach
Author:
- 16 November 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 30 (11) , 2210-2219
Abstract
Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originating in criminal behavior, their impact are also influenced by the decisions of legitimate end users. Getting agents in the Internet, and in networks in general, to invest in and deploy security features and protocols is a challenge, in particular because of economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. In this paper, we focus on the question of incentive alignment for agents of a large network towards a better security. We start with an economic model for a single agent, that determines the optimal amount to invest in protection. The model takes into account the vulnerability of the agent to a security breach and the potential loss if a security breach occurs. We derive conditions on the quality of the protection to ensure that the optimal amount spent on security is an increasing function of the agent's vulnerability and potential loss. We also show that for a large class of risks, only a small fraction of the expected loss should be invested. Building on these results, we study a network of interconnected agents subject to epidemic risks. We derive conditions to ensure that the incentives of all agents are aligned towards a better security. When agents are strategic, we show that security investments are always socially inefficient due to the network externalities. Moreover alignment of incentives typically implies a coordination problem, leading to an equilibrium with a very high price of anarchy.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
- Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networksGames and Economic Behavior, 2012
- How to distribute antidote to control epidemicsRandom Structures & Algorithms, 2010
- Uncertainty in Interdependent Security GamesLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010
- Network externalities and the deployment of security features and protocols in the internet2008
- A New Perspective on Internet Security using Insurance2008
- Optimal worm-scanning method using vulnerable-host distributionsInternational Journal of Security and Networks, 2007
- The economics of information security investmentACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2002
- Contracting with ExternalitiesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999
- Critical Mass and Network Size with Application to the US FAX MarketSSRN Electronic Journal, 1995
- Minimizing a Submodular Function on a LatticeOperations Research, 1978