Corruption and Competition: Toward Economic Theory of Corruption
Authors:
Preprint
- 12 October 2012
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Why corruption persists in governmental organization? While corruption is a problem of private sector as well as governmental sector, economic experts rather attempt to solve corruption in governmental organization. Moreover, economic literature sometimes defines corruption as a problem of the state. In this paper, we argue that the reason for persistence of corruption in governmental organization is the lack of monetary calculation within bureaucratic management and lower intensity of political competition in comparison with entrepreneurial market process. Market process serves as a means of feedback for efficient organizational arrangement.Keywords
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