Cumulative Prospect Theory and Managerial Incentives for Fraudulent Financial Reporting
- 16 September 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 32 (1) , 55-75
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Hong Kong Research Grant Council (4-ZZ6Y)
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