Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors
Authors:
- Blane D. LewisBLBlane D. Lewis
- Hieu T.M. NguyenHNHieu T.M. Nguyen
- Adrianus HendrawanAHAdrianus Hendrawan
- 1 September 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 64
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 46 references indexed in Scilit:
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