Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
Authors:
- 1 September 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 477, 63-76
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
Funding Information
- HAYAO NAKAYAMA
- JSPS KAKENHI (JP19K04903)
This publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
- Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and CompliancePLOS ONE, 2013
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s DilemmaProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2013
- Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner’s DilemmaProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2012
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponentProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2012
- Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain WorldAmerican Economic Review, 2012
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public InformationEconometrica, 1994
- Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noiseTheory and Decision, 1993
- A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma gameNature, 1993
- Tit for tat in heterogeneous populationsNature, 1992
- The Evolution of Reciprocal AltruismThe Quarterly Review of Biology, 1971