Abstract
This paper investigates the political determinants of informed insider trading using an international sample of firms from 28 countries. We show that insider trading in state-owned firms (SOEs) is statistically and economically more profitable and informative than that in non-state-owned firms, indicating a unique political information advantage enjoyed by these insiders. Further analysis shows that the insider trading of government-owned firms becomes more profitable during nation-wide politically uncertain periods and at times of introducing industry-specific government actions. Moreover, the aggregate insider trading of SOEs better predicts future stock market returns than non-SOEs. These results suggest that the political information advantage of SOE insiders is evident in both the idiosyncratic and macroeconomic information content of insider trading, consistent with the superior ability of these insiders to interpret the economic impact of country-, industry-, and firm-specific government actions.

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