Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
Author:
- Hervé MoulinHMHervé Moulin
- 1 January 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 144 (1) , 96-119
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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