Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament
- 29 April 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 104 (2) , 289-306
Abstract
This article promotes a characterization of intraparty politics that explains how rank- and-file party members control the delegation of power to their cabinet ministers and shadow cabinet ministers. Using the uncovered set as a solution concept and a measure of party members' collective preferences, we explore the hypothesis that backbenchers' preferences constrain the ministerial selection process in a manner that mitigates agency problems. Specifically, promotion is distributed preferentially to members whose own policy preferences are proximate to the uncovered set of all party members' preferences. Our analysis of ministerial appointments in the contemporary British Parliament supports this view. For both the Labour and Conservative parties, front bench appointments are more sensitive to the collective preferences of backbenchers in each party as measured by the party uncovered set than to the preferences of the parties' leaders.Keywords
This publication has 49 references indexed in Scilit:
- Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary DemocraciesAmerican Political Science Review, 2008
- The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule: Experiments on the Robustness of the Uncovered SetPolitical Analysis, 2007
- UK OC OK? Interpreting Optimal Classification Scores for the U.K. House of CommonsPolitical Analysis, 2007
- “A Theory Waiting to Be Discovered and Used”: A Reanalysis of Canonical Experiments on Majority-Rule Decision MakingThe Journal of Politics, 2006
- Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State LegislaturesAmerican Political Science Review, 2005
- Members of parliament and governments in western Europe: Agency relations and problems of oversightEuropean Journal of Political Research, 2000
- Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries2000
- Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the White HouseJournal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1994
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting ModelsEconometrica, 1979
- Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting ModelsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1979