BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
- 1 March 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 09 (01) , 105-118
Abstract
In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2005), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained equal-awards (A) rule and the constrained equal-losses (L) rule. We show that all rules within the TAL-family are partially non-manipulable and identify the domain of problems where each rule is either non-manipulable by merging or non-manipulable by splitting. We also show that they can be ranked in terms of their relative non-manipulability, according to the parameter that generates the family.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problemsReview of Economic Design, 2003
- Chapter 6 Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing2002
- Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problemReview of Economic Design, 1999
- Inequality Reducing Properties of Composite TaxationJournal of Economic Theory, 1996
- Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making1988
- The proportional solution for rights problemsMathematical Social Sciences, 1988
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methodsInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1987
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the TalmudJournal of Economic Theory, 1985
- A problem of rights arbitration from the TalmudMathematical Social Sciences, 1982
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under RiskEconometrica, 1979