Analysis of NEV Power Battery Recycling under Different Government Reward-Penalty Mechanisms
Open Access
- 24 August 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (17) , 10538
Abstract
As a valuable reuse resource, the efficient recycling of retired power batteries is of great significance to the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry. With the arrival of the NEV power battery decommissioning tide in China, how the government promotes the relevant responsible subject to improve the recovery rate is becoming urgent. Current studies have not considered the policy role of a government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) in power battery recycling. Therefore, based on the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system, this paper constructs three models under the government RPM: the government implements the RPM only for vehicle enterprises; the government implements the RPM only for power battery manufacturers, and the government implements the RPM for both vehicle enterprises and power battery manufacturers. The results of the study show that: on the one hand, when the government implements the RPM only for vehicle enterprises, the recovery rate is the highest, and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain is also the highest. Therefore, it is suggested that the government should set a target recycling rate according to the actual situation of each region and implement the RPM only for vehicle enterprises. On the other hand: when the government implements the RPM only for vehicle enterprises, they can implement the strategy of small profit and quick turnover to improve the recovery rate and their own profits. When the government implements the RPM only for power battery manufacturers, they should adopt the strategy of reducing the wholesale price of power battery to increase their profits by increasing sales. When the government implements the RPM for both vehicle enterprises and power battery manufacturers, if the vehicle enterprises share a large responsibility, all members of the closed-loop supply chain can benefit from the RPM.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71971131)
- Shanxi Scholarship Council of China (2022-027)
- MOE (Ministry of Education in China) Youth Project of Humanities and Social Sciences Fund (17YJC630121)
- Program for the Philosophy and Social Sciences Research of Higher Learning Institutions of Shanxi (2020W013)
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