Stackelberg Equilibria of an Anti-Jamming Game in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks
- 2 November 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
- Vol. 4 (1) , 121-134
Abstract
The deceiving attacker is a radio jammer, equipped with a cognitive radio (CR) platform, which senses the frequency spectrum and launches jamming actions to block, mask, or emulate the legitimate active wireless connections. Using the IEEE 802.22 cognitive radio network (CRN) as a basis, this paper proposes a set of deception-based defense strategies to protect the CRNs from the deceiving attack. The Stackelberg framework is adopted in the formulation of the security problem to account for the attacker’s reconnaissance capabilities. To this end, the Stackelberg equilibria (SE) between the attacker(s) and the defending CRs are calculated under the two cases when the attacker(s) and the defending CRs know and are uncertain about the primary user activity. The backward induction method is used to calculate the points of SE in the formulated security game. Both theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the defending CRs can decrease the probability of success of the deceiving attack to nearly 0% when the CRs have the incentive to defend the frequency channel(s).Keywords
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Searching One Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Using a Distributed Computation ApproachJournal of Computers, 2014
- Addressing Scalability and Robustness in Security Games with Multiple Boundedly Rational AdversariesLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014
- Stochastic Model for Cognitive Radio Networks under Jamming Attacks and Honeypot-Based PreventionLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014
- Beamforming for Direction-of-Arrival (DOA) Estimation-A SurveyInternational Journal of Computer Applications, 2013
- Optimizing Active Cyber Defense2013
- Deceptive Routing in Relay NetworksLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012
- Security applicationsACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2009
- On-Line Algorithms in Machine Learning1998
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete InformationManagement Science, 1972
- Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix GamesJournal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1964