How to make cooperation the optimizing strategy in a two‐person game
Authors:
- 1 January 1977
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 5 (2) , 173-186
Abstract
This paper demonstrates the existence of a partial tit‐for‐tat (matching) strategy which, when used by one player in an iterated “Prisoner's Dilemma” game, will induce a response of pure cooperation in the other player if that player behaves optimally. The minimum matching frequency of such a strategy is shown to be monotonically related to the Rapoport‐Chammah “Cooperation Index.”Keywords
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