Disadvantageous semicollusion
Authors:
- Neil GandalNGNeil Gandal
- 1 June 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 12 (2) , 141-154
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product DifferentiationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- Excess Capacity and CollusionInternational Economic Review, 1990
- OPEC production quotas and their application to non-OPEC countriesEnergy Policy, 1990
- Collusion among asymmetric firmsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1989
- Cartels, Profits and Excess CapacityInternational Economic Review, 1987
- An Analysis of Cooperative Research and DevelopmentThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1986
- Capital Investments and Price Agreements in Semicollusive MarketsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1986
- Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot OutcomesThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
- Is Collusion Profitable?Review of Economics and Statistics, 1976
- A Theory of OligopolyJournal of Political Economy, 1964