Patent systems for encouraging innovation: Lessons from economic analysis
- 1 November 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Research Policy
- Vol. 35 (9) , 1423-1440
Abstract
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This publication has 47 references indexed in Scilit:
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