Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing
Authors:
- 18 February 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Finance
- Vol. 19 (2) , 519-570
Abstract
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their competitors’ expenses if borrowers’ collateral is sufficiently risky. These incentives lead to credit rationing and positive-profit interest rates, possibly exceeding the monopoly level. If banks share information about past debts and seniority via credit reporting systems, the incentive to overborrow is mitigated: interest and default rates decrease; credit access improves if the value of collateral is not very volatile, but worsens otherwise. Recent empirical studies report evidence consistent with these predictions. The article also shows that private and social incentives to share information are not necessarily aligned.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 34 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the Non-Exclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical InvestigationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
- Information sharing and credit: Firm-level evidence from transition countriesJournal of Financial Intermediation, 2009
- Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit MarketContributions in Theoretical Economics, 2006
- Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive ContractsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2004
- Contractual Externalities and Common Agency EquilibriaAdvances in Theoretical Economics, 2003
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with ExternalitiesEconometrica, 2003
- Information sharing, lending and defaults: Cross-country evidenceJournal of Banking & Finance, 2002
- Competition in Loan ContractsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country EvidenceJournal of Financial Intermediation, 2000
- Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and EfficiencyJournal of Financial Intermediation, 1997