On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies
- 4 September 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
- Vol. 23 (4)
Abstract
Article On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies was published on December 1, 2017 in the journal Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy (volume 23, issue 4).Keywords
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