Shareholders and the Atom of Property: Fission or Fusion?
- 1 March 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 39 (1) , 49-75
Abstract
The separation of ownership and control is said to have exploded the atom of property in the modern corporation. This article suggests that if the atom ever did split, it may have recently been “fused” by a combination of shareholder activism and concentration in ownership representation. After outlining Berle and Means’s seminal thesis and several rebuttal arguments, the article recounts the forces that have led to the reconcentration of ownership and control in shareholders’ hands. This consolidation’s impact on shareholder property rights is then examined, leading to the conclusion that Berle and Means’s explosion thesis no longer holds.Keywords
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