Endogenous Shifts in OPEC Market Power: A Stackelberg Oligopoly with Fringe
Preprint
- 2 January 2013
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This article proposes a two-stage oligopoly model for the crude oil market. In a game of several Stackelberg leaders, market power increases endogenously as theKeywords
All Related Versions
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