Abstract
We investigate how corporate insiders respond to Say-on-Pay (SoP) voting outcomes, particularly following strong shareholder support, and whether they engage in opportunistic trading to offset potential adverse impacts on their explicit compensation. Using a comprehensive sample of open-market insider transactions in U.S. firms following SoP votes from 2011 to 2021, we empirically test three competing hypotheses to explain insider trading behavior following SoP outcomes: the opportunism, liquidation, and governance hypotheses. Contrary to concerns about opportunistic trading, we find no evidence that insiders earn abnormal profits from transactions following high SoP support. Our results also do not corroborate governance hypothesis which predicts lower insider trading and profits following higher SoP support. Instead, our findings indicate that insiders increase the value of sales that do not yield abnormal profits in firms with strong SoP support. These findings support liquidation hypothesis and remain robust to alternative measures of insider trading and SoP voting outcomes. Our results also persist after controlling for executive compensation levels and year-over-year pay changes. Additional channel analyses suggest this relationship is particularly pronounced in firms with lower cash-based compensation and stronger historical performance, suggesting that liquidity motives and contrarian timing behavior play a central role in shaping insider sales in firms with high SoP support. Overall, our findings underscore the effectiveness of Say-on-Pay regulations by showing that insiders do not circumvent compensation oversight through opportunistic trading but instead engage in sales primarily driven by liquidity needs and market timing considerations.

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