Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency
Authors:
- Serdar DalkirSDSerdar Dalkir
- John W. LoganJLJohn W. Logan
- Robert T. MassonRMRobert T. Masson
- 1 April 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 18 (3) , 383-413
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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