A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks
Authors:
- 1 October 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 14 (6) , 857-886
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